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ARTICLES 
THE NONMARITAL SEXUAL 
CONDUCT OF CUSTODIAL 
MOTHERS: A STUDY OF 
CALIFORNIA'S PRECARIOUS 
PARENTAL RIGHTS 
Barbara Child· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mothers of minor children engage in sexual conduct with 
men to whom they are not married. That is no longer a shocking 
truth. Nonetheless, those mothers continue to live with a Damo-
cles sword hanging over their heads. Their sexual conduct can 
still cause them to lose their children, even in these supposedly 
liberated times in the state of California. I 
Four factors combine to produce such an insecure status for 
the sexually active custodial mother:' 
[1] the multiplicity of statutes available as tools for those 
who might seek to take her children from her;· 
• Visiting Assistant Professor and Director of Writing and Research, Golden Gate 
University School of LaW; B.A. 1980, M.A. 1963, Indiana University; J.D. 1977, Univer-
sity of Akron. 
1. This Article focuses exclusively on heterosexual behavior of custodial mothers. 
For a study of the legal status of lesbian mothers, see Comment The Lesbian Family: 
Rights in Conflict Under the Californi4 Uniform Parentage Act, 10 GoLDB GATB U.L. 
REv. 1007 (1980) and sources cited therein. 
2. The term "sexually active mother" will refer throughout to the mother who en-
gages in sexual activity with one or more men to whom she is not married, whether or 
not she is married to someone else. 
3. Bodenheimer, The Multiplicity of Child Custody Proceedings-Problems of Cal-
ifornia Law, 23 STAN. L. REv. 703, 704-05 (1971): see infra text accompanying notes 43-
505 
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[2] ambiguous language in those statutes;4 
[3] the broad discretion of trial courts in both making cus-
tody awards' and later modifying them;' and 
[4] appellate courts' insistence upon a "very strong pre-
sumption in favor of the order[s] of the court[s] below'" 
such that "over the years the appellate courts have al-
most completely abdicated in [the custody] field in 
favor of the trial courts."8 
This Article surveys the cases in which the most commonly 
used ambiguous statutes together with secure judicial discretion 
have been brought to bear on custodial mothers who either by 
choice or by economic necessity do not live conventional middle-
class lives. The survey shows that, in general, poor women stand 
to lose more than middle-class women, but in some respects it is 
more difficult for the poor to lose. Fourteenth amendment due 
process protections inhibit the authorities who seek total, irrevo-
cable termination of parental rights; discretion aids the vindic-
tive, monied ex-husband who seeks only transfer of custody, 
which gets managed far more simply on the premise that a later 
modification will always be available if another transfer becomes 
appropriate. 
II. THE HISTORY OF CUSTODY LAW 
Any discussion of child custody law should begin with rec-
ognition that at common law not only was the father's right to 
custody of minor legitimate children superior to that of their 
motherj9 his right was "virtually undefeatable" except for "fla-
grant" unfitness.1o This is not surprising because the custody 
right began as a feudal property right in a culture where a child 
was a financial asset to its father.ll California family law began 
44. 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 66-85, 95-102, 113-16, 126-28. 
5. See infra text accompanying notes SO, 120, 148, 184. 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 137, 139-,n. 
7. Stack v. Stack, 189 Cal. App. 2d 357, 372, 11 Cal. Rptr. 177, 188 (1961). 
8. [d. at 272-73, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 188. 
9. E. PECK, THE LAw or PERSONS AND or DoMESTIC RELATIONS 371 (1930). 
10. W. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw or PERSONS AND DoMESTIC RELATIONS 343 
(1921). 
11. tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: [ts Origin, Development, 
and Present Status (pt. 2), 16 STAN. L. REv. 900, 925 (1964). See Foster & Freed, Child 
Women's Law Forum 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss3/1
1982] CUSTODIAL PARENTS 507 
largely as a codification of the common lawl • except insofar as 
the California Civil Code of 1872 was founded on the New York 
Field Draft Codes. IS It still reflected the father's nearly unquali-
fied custody right;14 not until 1913 was the Civil Code amended 
to give both parents equal right to custody'" 
Before the code was amended, however, California case law 
began to lay down CC[t]he enduring rule ... that parents [not 
just fathers] have a paramount right to their children unless 
they are affirmatively found to be unfit."le This means that CCthe 
right . . . cannot be taken away merely because the court may 
believe that some third person can give the child[ren] better 
care and greater protection. tIlT 
The parental preference doctrine has fostered giving less at-
tention to children as property and instead acknowledging "that 
parents generally are more likely than strangers to give children 
the care they need because of the nature of parenthood. "18 The 
doctrine has retained respect in California in such pronounce-
ments as this one: "[I]t must be taken as settled law that in this 
state the courts place more stress on the right of the parent to 
custody of the child (except where the parent is unfit) than on 
the best interests and welfare of the child."l' The doctrine's vi-
tality has been acknowledged even in cases where parents lost 
their children because the parents were found unfit," and even 
Custody 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 423, 424·25 (1964) for discussion of the English 8tatUtes that 
gave and gradually expanded mothers' cuatodial rights. 
12. tenBroek, supra note 11, at 913. 
13. tenBroek, supra note 11 (pt. I), 16 STAN. L. REv. 257, 258. For further discussion 
of CalifOrnia'8 reliance on the Field Codes, see Klepe, The Revision and Codification of 
California Statutes 1849-1953, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 766 (1954); Parma, The History of the 
Adoption of the Code. of California, 22 L. Lma. J. 8 (1929). 
14. tenBroek, supra note 13, at 313. 
15. CAL. CIV. COOl § 197 (West 1954). 
16. tenBroek, supra Dote 11, at 923 (disCU88ing In re Campbell, 130 Cal. 380, 62 
P. 613 (1900». 
17. In re White, 54 Cal. App. 2d 637, 640, 129 P.2d 706, 708 (1942). For further 
discussion of the history of the doctrine in California, see Bodenheimer, New Trends 
and Requirements in Adoption Law and Proposals for Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 10 (1975); Porter & Walsh, The Evolution of California's Child Custody Laws: A 
Question of Statutory Interpretation, 7 Sw. U.L. REv. 1 (1975). 
18. tenBroek, supra note 11, at 926·27 (commenting in part on Guardianship of 
Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 888 (1954». 
19. Shea v. Shea, 100 Cal. App. 2d 50, 66, 223 P.2d 32, 35 (1950). 
20. See Adoption of D.S.C., 93 Cal. App. 3d 14, 155 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1979); Adoption 
of Oukes. 14 Cal. App. 3d 459. 92 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1971). 
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though it has been criticized for its rigidity, its continuing to 
manifest some interest in children as property, and its failure to 
attend sufficiently to the children's own interests. 11 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the inter-
est of a parent in retaining custody as both "cognizable and sub-
stantial."11 More importantly, the Court has spoken of that in-
terest in terms that distinguish it from any property interest in a 
child as chattel: "It is plain that the interest of a parent in the 
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her 
children 'comers] to this Court with a momentum for respect 
lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely 
from shifting economic arrangements.'''u 
The right to custody has traditionally carried with it the 
freedom to bring up one's child one's own way, a freedom re-
garded by the Supreme Court as worthy of fourteenth amend-
ment due process protection.'· Probably the best known com-
ment by the Court on parental custody rights is in Prince v. 
Massachusetts:" "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care 
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose pri-
mary function and freedom include preparation for obligations 
the state can neither supply nor hinder.'''' Yet the Court in that 
case upheld the Massachusetts child labor laws as a reasonable 
exercise of the state's "wide range of power for limiting parental 
freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare.''I' 
Thus, Prince might more appropriately be known for its expres-
sion of the power of the state as parens patriae" to limit par-
ents' rights. The Court has often since affirmed the parens pa-
triae power of the state, grounded in an interest in "[t]he well-
being of its children."" 
21. Adoption of Oukes, 14 Cal. App. 3d 459, 469, 92 Cal. Rptr. 390, 397 (1971) (cit-
ing In re Neal, 265 Cal. App. 2d 482, 489-90, 71 Cal. Rptr. 300, 305 (1968». 
22. Stanley v. Dlinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972). 
23. Id. at 651 (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 338 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring». 
24. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (relying on Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923». 
25. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
26. Id. at 166. 
27. Id. at 167. 
28. Id. at 166. 
29. Ginsberi v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). See ago Parham v. J.R., 442 
Women's Law Forum 
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The state's parens patriae power should be understood as 
distinct from its police power, the latter being its "inherent ple-
nary power both to prevent its citizens from harming one an-
other and to promote all aspects of the public welfare. "so While 
both powers may rightfully limit parental rights, "to the extent 
that the state may not directly regulate morality within the fam-
ily through its police powers, it is difficult to justify such regula-
tion under its parens patriae role. "11 Either power, especially if 
misused, has the capacity to interfere drastically with family 
privacy. 
The Supreme Court's recognition of a constitutionally pro-
tected right of privacy in the context of the family has been ex-
pressed of tens. and linked expressly with due process protec-
tion. as However, this recognition came in connection with 
contraceptives imd pregnancy, matters more strictly related to 
the marital relationship than to the parent-child relationship. 
. Furthermore, for all its rhetorical support for family auton-
omy and privacy, the Court has also consistently expressed sup-
port for the family as an institution promoting the moral educa-
tion and protection of youth." In Moore v. City 01 East 
Cleveland," the Court proclaimed: "[T]he Constitution prevents 
[the state] from standardizing its children-and its adults-by 
forcing all to live in certain narrowly defined family patterns."1t 
Yet the ordinance it struck down was constitutionally defective 
for defining "family" so as to exclude a group of relatives con-
sisting of a woman, her son, and two grandsons; the case in no 
way disturbed the Court's earlier decision to sustain an ordi-
nance restricting unrelated individuals living together." Even 
more striking is the reference in Moore to the family's role of 
u.s. 584 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth. 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
30. Development' in the lAw-The Conatitution and the Family, 93 HAav. L. REv. 
1156, 1198-99 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the lAw). 
31. [d. at 1320. 
32. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113. 153 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 485-87 (1965) (Goldberg. J .• concurring). 
33. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur. 414 U.S. 632.639-40 (1974). 
34. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1.9 (1974); Ginsberg v. New York. 
390 U.S. 629. 639 (1968). 
35. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
36. [d. at 506. 
37. Belle Te"e, 416 U.S. 1. 
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"inculcat[ing] and pass[ing] down many of our most cherished 
values, moral and cultural.",a "The Court has never [expressly] 
decided . . . whether the state has any interests in enforcing 
morality that are sufficiently important to override an individ-
ual's fundamental rights in the family context."" On the other 
hand, it appears that various individual justices believe "that 
the states constitutionally may prohibit extramarital, premarital, 
or other 'immoral' sexual behavior. lifO 
III. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN PARENTS' RIGHTS 
AND CHILDREN'S BEST INTERESTS 
It flies in the face of nature to expect of every custodial 
mother that she either be married and fulfill her sexual needs 
exclusively with her husband or else remain celibate for the du-
ration of her children's minority, however many years that may 
be. "Among the personal liberties ranked as fundamental must 
be those necessary to satisfy basic needs that every human being 
experiences [including t]he need for sexual fulfiJJment .... 
That fact is now so firmly buttressed by modem science as to be 
unquestionable . . . . "fl Yet the mother who for any of a myr-
iad of reasons fulfills some of her basic sexual needs outside of 
marriage must do so under the Damocles sword. 
The sword bears a government stamp. 
When one observes the expanding power of gov-
ernment into the family sphere, one must begin to 
readjust one's legal concept of family relation-
ships, especially that of parent and child . . . . 
From a legal perspective, that relationship is 
probably the least secure in the family constella-
tion . . . . [I]t is susceptible to subtle, indirect, 
and sometimes direct intrusions.41 
In California there are at least eight different statutory pro-
38. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-04. 
39. Developments in the Law, supra note 30, at 1209. 
40. Id. at 1208-09 (citing, e.g., Carey v. Population Sern. Inn, 431 U_S. 678, 702 
(1977) (White, J., concurring in relevant part); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
498-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 546 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
41. W. BARNE'IT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 97 (1973). 
42. S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL: THE LAw's REsPONSB TO FAMILY BREAKDOWN 5 
(1971). 
Women's Law Forum 
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ceedings to affect the custody of children." These include "three 
major bodies of law. . .: the law of guardianship of the person, 
the law of juvenile dependency, and what may be termed general 
custody law, applied most frequently in marriage dissolution 
proceedings,"·· as well as a variety of specialized proceedings.tll 
In this multiplicity of available proceedings, it is not that 
the old notion of parental right has died. In a contest between 
parent and non-parent, it survives in a well-established pre-
sumption of fitness.·' Another old presumption that has not sur-
vived, however, is the "tender years" presumption. When the 
contest for custody is between the mother and the father, it used 
to be to the mother's advantage if the child was of "tender 
years";'" however, since the 1972 amendments to California Civil 
Code Section 4600," that advantage has been taken away." 
Moreover, any advantage provided by the statutory presumption 
before 1972 may have been more illusory than real, given the 
discretion with which trial courts could choose to abandon it or 
find it successfully rebutted.1IO 
The concept that is supposed to have overcome all the old 
presumptions and is to govern every custody award is the "best 
interests of the child."1I1 Mr. Justice Cardozo is credited with 
first fully setting forth the concept: 
The Chancellor in exercising his jurisdiction . . . 
does not proceed upon the theory that the peti-
tioner, whether father or mother, has a cause of 
action against the other or indeed against any 
one. He acts as parens patriae to do what is best 
for the interest of 'the child . . . . He is not adju-
dicating a controversy between adversary parties, 
43. Bodenheimer, supra note S, at 704·05. 
44. Id. at 704 (citations omitted). 
45. Id. at 704·05. 
46. See In re Marriage or Williams, 101 Cal. App. 3d 507, 511, 161 Cal. Rptr. 808, 
810 (1980) (citing In re Estate or Barassi, 265 Cal. App. 2d 282, 287, 71 Cal. Rptr. 249, 
253 (1968)). 
47. E.,., White v. White, 109 Cal. App. 2d 522, 523, 240 P.2d 1015, 1015-16 (1952). 
48. (West Supp. 1982). 
49. See In re Marriage or Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 730, 598 P.2d 36, 38, 157 Cal. 
Rptr. 383, 385 (1979). 
SO. See Luck v. Luck, 92 Cal. 653, 28 P. 787 (1892); Wood v. Wood, 207 Cal. App. 2d 
33, 24 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1962). 
51. See R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE CO .... ON LAw 189 (1921). 
7
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to compose their private differences. He is not de-
termining rights "as between a parent and a 
child" or as between one parent and another 
. . . . Equity does not concern itself with such 
disputes in their relation to the disputants. Its 
concern is for the child. a. 
Unfortunately, to proclaim that the best interests of the child 
should be paramount is still merely to engage in fine-sounding 
but insubstantial rhetoric unless there are standards for deter-
mining what in fact is in a child's best interests. The American 
Bar AssociatioJ} once polled its members involved in custody liti-
gation and was forced to conclude that "there is total disagree-
ment and variety as to what aspects of family life make up 'best 
interests and welfare.' "III 
It is not that standards have never been developed. They 
have been. Professor Katz, who formerly chaired the ABA Sec-
tion of Family Law, describes what he calls the "constellation of 
social values incorporated in the 'best interests of the child' 
doctrine ":114 
We say that we expect children to be physically 
and emotionally secure; to become responsible cit-
izens in their community and to become economi-
cally independent; to acquire an education and 
develop skills; to respect people of different races, 
religions, and national, social and economic back-
grounds; to become socially responsible and hon-
orable and to have a sense of family loyalty." 
Such a list is helpful insofar as it spells out goals, that is, the 
long view of what custody awards are hoped to accomplish. 
For the short view, that is, for the participants in litigation, 
more immediately practical help is also available in the Uniform 
62. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433·34, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925). For the same 
principle elucidated in California, see Prouty v. Prouty, 16 Cal. 2d 190, 195, 105 P.2d 
295,298 (1940). CAL. CIV. CODE § 138 (1872), referring to "necessary or proper" custody 
orders, provided no standards at all. The "best interest" provision was not added until 
1931 (West 1954). For a discuBBion see tenBroek, supra note 11, at 917. 
53. Summary 01 ABA Report, 2 FAY. L. REP. 2719 (1976). 
54. S. KATZ, supra note 42, at xv, n. 2. 
55. Katz, Book Review, 64 MICH. L. REv. 756, 763 (1966). 
Women's Law Forum 
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Marriage and Divorce Act, Ie which sets out the following method 
for determining custody: 
The court shall determine custody in accordance 
with the best interests of the child. The court 
shall consider all relevant factors including: 
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents 
as to his custody; 
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian; 
(3) the interaction and inter-relationship of 
the child with his parent or parents, his siblings, 
and any other person who may significantly aft'ect 
the child's best interest; 
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, 
school, and community; and 
(5) the mental and physical health of all indi-
viduals involved." 
With respect to the concerns of the sexually active mother, the 
most significant part of the Uniform Act's best interest provision 
may be its concluding sentence, specifying what is not relevant: 
"The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian 
that does not affect his relationship to the child."" California 
has amended its custody law several times since the Uniform 
Act became available as a model," yet the Uniform Act has 
never been incorporated into California law. 
Finally, although it is typical to refer to the parent's 
"rights" and the child's "interests," those interests may also de-
serve to be thought of as rights. The best interest standard "ar_ 
guably has become a rule of constitutional necessity, based in 
due process. Such reasoning is based on the premise that the 
child has a liberty interest in his custody . . . . 'teo There is, of 
course, a United States Supreme Court history establishing that 
children have constitutional liberties of their own.'1 Moreover, it 
56. See R. LBvv, UNlPORM MAiuuAOE AND DIVORCE LBoISLA110N: A PRBLIMlNARY 
Alw.Y8JB 93·95 (1969). 
57. UNIFORM MAiuuAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402 (1970). 
58.Id. 
59. CAL elV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1982). 
60. Strickman, Marrw.ge, DilJorce and the COnBtitution, 15 FAM. L.Q. 259, 328 
(1982). 
61. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979): Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 
(1977): Goes v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community 
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969): In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
9
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is tempting to rely on this impressive history to reach a conclu-
sion that because "[a] child's welfare may best be served in the 
custody of his adulterous ... or otherwise immoral parent, [it 
follows that] a categorical rule disqualifying a parent found mor-
ally deficient would seem to violate the right of the child not to 
be deprived of liberty without due process of law."el 
However, to advise a mother about her conduct based on 
the Supreme Court's actual explanations of due process princi-
ples, one must take care not to rest too heavy a weight on 
Gaulte• and its successors. In Bellotti v. Baird, e4 the most recent 
case in the series, the Court recalls Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land- and warns: 
The unique role in our society of the family . . . 
requires that constitutional principles be applied 
with sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs 
of parents and children. We have recognized three 
reasons justifying the conclusion that the consti-
tutional rights of children cannot be equated with 
those of adults: the peculiar vulnerability of chil-
dren; their inability to make critical decisions in 
an informed, mature manner; and the importance 
of the parental role in child rearing." 
This scarcely sounds like a view compatible with approving of a 
child's remaining in the custody of an "immoral" parent. 
IV. CALIFORNIA'S STATUTORY BATTLEGROUNDS 
A. FREEDOM FROM PARENTAL CUSTODY AND CONTROL 
The most drastic loss that can befall a mother under the 
California statutes occurs if her child is "declared free from 
[her] custody and control,'te7 for such a declaration "terminates 
all parental rights and responsibilities with regard to the 
child,"" thereby freeing the child for adoption." 
62. Strickman, supra Dote 60, at 330. 
63. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1969). 
64. 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
65. 431 U.S. 494. 
66. 443 U.S. at 634. 
67. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a) (West Supp. 1982). 
68. I d. § 232.6. 
69.ld. 
Women's Law Forum 
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Of the categories of children who might be declared "free 
from parental custody and control," two are especially suscepti-
ble of application to the children of sexually active mothers: 
"neglected" children70 and children "whose parent ... [is] mor-
ally depraved. "71 The statute provides no definition of either 
category. However, for a child in either category to be found free 
from parental custody and control, that child must have been 
removed from the parent's custody and made a dependent of the 
juvenile court for a full year." Therefore, such a drastic 10s8 as 
this cannot occur without there having been earlier court pro-
ceedings resulting in the parent's loss of custody. 
On the other hand, a statutory section has been added that 
calls for liberal construction "to serve and protect the interests 
and welfare of .the child."71 One court has said of the addition 
that its purpose "was to change 'the rigidity of existing custody 
rules preferential to the natural parents over third parties' 
which stressed 'a proprietary or property interest in children' 
and did not assure the 'best interests of the children.' "74 A more 
recent opinion insists that "the right of parenting is not to be 
subordinated to the best interests of the child. Rather, the pa-
rental right . . . is to be terminated only if the parent is found 
to be unfit and parental custody is found to be harmful to the 
child. "711 Other cases are not appreciably more precise in estab-
lishing what parental conduct is sufficiently reprehensible to in-
voke the statute, although there is acknowledgement that termi-
nation is "drastic'f'Je and appropriate only in "extreme cases.'f'J7 
70. Id. § 232(a)(2). 
71. Id. § 232(a)(3). 
72. Id. §§ 232(a)(2), 232(a)(3). Cf. MODEL ACT TO FREE CHILDREN FOR PERMANENT 
PLACEMENT § 4, reported at 13 FAM. L.Q. 329, 333-34 (1979) (no requirement as to length 
of time passing since adjudication of neglect; no reference to "moral depravity" or any 
other language that could be similarly construed.) 
73. CAL. CJV. CoDE § 232.5 (West Supp. 1982). 
74. Adoption of Oukes, 14 Cal. App. 3d 459, 469, 92 Cal. Rptr. 390,397 (1971) (quot-
ing In re Neal, 265 Cal. App. 2d 482, 489-90, 71 Cal. Rptr. 300, 305 (1968». 
75. Adoption of D.S.C., 93 Cal. App. 3d 14, 24, 155 Cal. Rptr. 406, 411 (1979). See 
also In re Susan Lynn M., 53 Cal. App. 3d 300, 310, 125 Cal. Rptr. 707, 713 (1975) ("A 
judgment freeing a child from the custody and control of its parents. . . amounts to the 
taking of 'a liberty' under the due process clause of the United States Constitution."). 
Cf. MODEL ACT TO FREE CHILDREN FOR PERMANENT PLACEMENT l(b)(4), supra note 71, at 
330 ("[TJhe interests of the child shall prevail if the child's interests and parental rights 
conflict . . . ."). 
76. In re T.M.R., 41 Cal. App. 3d 694, 703, 116 Cal. Rptr. 292, 298 (1974); In re 
Zimmerman, 206 Cal. App. 2d 835, 845, 24 Cal. Rptr. 329, 334 (1962). 
11
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With respect to the terminology that might be expected to 
apply to sexually active mothers, there is some helpful narrow-
ing in the moral depravity cases. Attention has been given to the 
statute's reference to parents who "are morally depraved,''?' 
with the present tense of the verb as grounds for not admitting 
evidence of past conduct.711 One case provides even more specific 
guidance in mentioning that there was "no substantial evidence 
of any immoral conduct on [the mother's] part at the time of the 
hearing or during a period of at least four to five months imme-
diately preceding it."'O Furthermore, the law requires that the 
one year's loss of custody prior to the termination petition must 
have been "because of such ... moral depravity."11 Therefore, 
at the very least, the history of the mother's own case ought to 
put her on notice and at the same time provide her with the 
potential means of preventing the permanent loss of her chid. If, 
and only if, her sexual conduct caused her to lose custody in 
dependency proceedings, continuing that same conduct should 
result in termination of parental rights; it is at least arguable 
that refraining from that conduct for some months prior to the 
hearing should stave off the termination. 
With respect to a sexual relationship per se substantiating 
an allegation of neglect, such has been tried and has failed. II 
Voicing its criticism for the confusion of issues, one court said: 
"[A] parent's relationship to a live-in nonspouse may be relevant 
to determine the suitability of the home . . . . [However, 
e]vidence of immorality must be connected causally to a detri-
mental effect on the children's welfare."11 
This same court also distinguishes between the strict neg-
77. In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 489, 579 P.2d 514, 518, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 
627 (1978); In re T.M.R., 41 Cal. App. 3d 694, 703, 116 Cal. Rptr. 292, 298 (1974). For 
arguments against precise language, see Howe, Development of a Model Act to Free 
Children for Permanent Placement: A Calle Study in Low and Social Planning. 13 FAN. 
L.Q. 257. 296-98 (1979). 
78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(3). 
79. In re Zimmerman, 206 Cal. App. 2d 835, 844, 24 Cal. Rptr. 329, 335 (1962), 
quoted in In re R.R.R., 18 Cal. App. 3d 973, 982. 96 Cal. Rptr. 308, 313 (1971) (constru-
ing former statute with identical language). 
80. In re Zimmerman, 206 Cal. App. 2d 835. 845, 24 Cal. Rptr. 329, 335 (1962). 
81. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(3). 
82. In re Jack H., 106 Cal. App. 3d 257. 165 Cal. Rptr. 646 (l980). 
83. Id. at 268-69, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 653. 
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lect standard required for termination and the much less strict 
standard acceptable for a finding of dependency at the earlier 
proceedings. Over and over again, the court insists that for ter-
mination "mere neglect" will not suffice." Rather, the mother 
deserves "to have the circumstances leading to the earlier order 
reviewed in the light of subsequent events, and with considera-
tion of the nature of the order sought in the second proceed-
ings.SII Furthermore, "'[d]etriment' must be found in the present 
circumstance rather than upon assumptions as to the circum-
stances thought to have existed at the time of the . . . depen-
dency evaluation."1t Here then is additional authority to say not 
only that past acts, if relevant at all, are not sufficient in and of 
themselves, but also that even present acts may not be pre-
sumed detrimental but instead must be shown to be so. 
Termination proceedings have long been recognized by the 
United States Supreme Court as proper occasions for fourteenth 
amendment due process protection.'" Determining that due pro-
cess applies, however, is only the first step. One must then in-
quire as to the extent, for "[t]he extent to which procedural due 
process must be afforded . . . is influenced by the extent to 
which [one] may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss.'''" In 
Santosky v. Kramer," the Court applies the three-pronged test 
of extent set out in Mathews v. Eldridge" and concludes: ccIn 
parental rights termination proceedings, the private interest af-
fected is commanding; the risk of error from using a preponder-
ance standard [such as the evidentiary standard challenged in 
Santosky] is substantial; and the countervailing governmental 
interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight. ,,.1 The 
Court then holds that ccdue process requires that the State sup-
port its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence.''" 
84. Id. at 267, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 652. 
85. Id. (quoting In re Morrow, 9 Cal. App. 3d 39, 55, 88 Cal. Rptr. 142, 152 (1970». 
86. Id. (citing In re James M., 65 Cal. App. 3d 254, 265, 135 Cal. Rptr. 222, 228 
(1976». 
87. See Santosky v. Kramer, 50 U.S.L.W. 4333 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1982); Lassiter v. De-
partment of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Quilloin v. Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); 
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965). 
88. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refu-
gee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring». 
89. 50 U.S.L.W. 4333 (U.S. March 23, 1982). 
90. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
91. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4336. 
92. Id. at 4333. 
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In Santosky. California is listed as one of the states that 
mandate the proper standard by statute. II However. the code 
subdivision in question" applies to only certain restricted kinds 
of evidence about only one category of children, those who have 
been in foster homes or other specified facilities for at least two 
years. The clear and convincing standard is by no means statu-
torily mandated as to evidence in general sufficient to result in a 
finding of freedom from custody and control. However, what 
California has not done by statute it has done by case law. In 
fact, it has gone farther than the Supreme Court requires in 
Santosky by requiring clear and convincing evidence even in the 
less drastic dependency setting." 
What emerges from studying the application of due process 
in cases decided under California's termination law is the con-
clusion that a sexually active mother can probably prevent per-
manent termination of her parental relationship on account of 
her sexual conduct; at least she can if she is either well educated 
as to her rights or well represented. Precisely because termina-
tion is drastic, questions about procedure and due process al-
most completely overshadow attention to the particular facts 
about any given mother's conduct. The cases abound with refer-
ences to liberties and rights. Much less is said about any partic-
ular factors affecting the child's best interests. Ultimately, since 
the Supreme Court has chosen to grant this particular form of 
family law proceedings' constitutional ramifications, the mother 
has much in the law to protect her. 
B. DEPENDENCY 
The wardship that is a condition precedent to termination 
proceedings for neglected children or those of morally depraved 
parents is accomplished through dependency proceedings." The 
applicable language in the dependency statute says that among 
the children who may be adjudged dependent is one "who is in 
need of proper and effective parental care and control and . . . 
93. Id. at 4334, n.3 (referring to CAL. CIV. CoDa I 232(a)(7)(West Supp. 1982)). 
94. CAL. CIV. CoDa 5 232(a)(7). 
95. See In re W.O., 88 Cal. App. 3d 906, 909, 152 Cal. Rptr. 130, 132 (1979); In re 
Robert P., 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 319, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5, 10 (1976), appeal dismissed, 431 
U.S. 911 (1977). 
96. CAL. WELP. & INST. COOl art. 6 (West Supp. 1982). 
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has no parent. . willing to exercise or capable of exercising 
such care or control, or has no parent or guardian actually exer-
cising such care or control.''''' Likewise subject to a dependency 
action is the child "whose home is an unfit place for him by rea-
son of neglect. . . [or] depravity. . . of either of his parents. "tl8 
Since having a child judged dependent and a ward of the court 
does not mean an end to the legal parental relationship or even 
necessarily a permanent termination of physical custody, the 
parent's due process rights are regarded as considerably less ex-
tensive." Nonetheless, California does attend to those rirhts by 
requiring the clear and convincing evidentiary standard and by 
restricting the consideration of fitness to the time of the 
hearing.1°O 
The test by which the court must decide in a dependency 
case is provided by statute: 
Before the court makes any order awarding cus-
tody to a person or persons other than a parent, 
without the consent of the parents, it must make 
a finding that an award of custody to a parent 
would be detrimental to the child and the award 
to a nonparent is required to serve the best inter-
ests of the child.lo1 
This provision has been specifically held applicable to juvenile 
court proceedings;lOI in the same case the California Supreme 
Court acknowledges the difficulty of defining "detrimental": 
It is a nearly impossible task to devise detailed 
standards which will leave the courts sufficient 
flexibility to make the proper judgment in all cir-
cumstances . . . The important point is that the 
97. CAL. WBLF. & INST. CODE § 3OO(a) (West Supp. 1982) (formerly § 6OO(a) , the 
relevant language or which was the same). 
98. Id. § 3OO(d) (formerly § 6OO(d), the language of which was the same). 
99. Singleman, A Cose 01 Negkct: Pare"" Patriae Versus Due Process in Child 
Neglect Proceedings, 17 ARIz. L. REv. 1055, 1057 (1975). 
100. See In re Robert P., 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal: Rptr. 5 (1976), appeal dis-
missed 431 U.S. 911 (1977). 
101. CAL. CIV. CoDE § 46OO(b)(l) (West Supp. 1982). 
102. See In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 683, 523 P.2d 244, 246, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 446 
(1974), for legislative history of Section 4600 in the 1966 REPoRT OF THE GOVERNOR'S 
COMM'N ON THE FAMILY, providing explanation of the purposeful shift from the earlier 
requirement of finding a parent unfit to present requirement of finding parental custody 
detrimental; for discussion of the earlier standard, see tenBroek, supra note 11, at 966-
67. 
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intent of the Legislature is that the court con-
sider parental custody to be highly preferable. 
Parental custody must be clearly detrimental to 
the child before custody can be awarded to a 
nonparent. 108 
This may be a little like attempting to explain what will warrant 
termination by saying over and over again that it is "drastic." 
Emphatic devices are not an entirely satisfactory substitute for 
actual definitions and spelled-out standards, but they are better 
than nothing. Presumably "clearly detrimental" is more detri-
mental than, say, "merely detrimental" would be. 
The trouble with assuming that courts will regard detriment 
under the Civil Code provision as difficult to prove is that Civil 
Code Section 4600 operates here in the context of the depen-
dency statute, Section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code,l04 part of a body of law specifically designed for the 
poor. loa In feudal England "[ploor people were excluded from 
the idea that parents should be allowed to raise their own chil-
dren."l" The Elizabethan Poor LawlO'7 embodies the principle of 
taking children away from parents who could not provide for 
them and making the children indentured apprentices. lOB Given 
the history of California family law, it is not surprising for it to 
be characterized as "not single, uniform, and equal as to all fam-
ilies whatever their status, condition, or wealth. On the contrary, 
it is dual and distinguishes among families on the basis of 
poverty. "10tl 
103. In re B.G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 698, 523 P.2d 244, 257, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 457 (1974) 
(quoting 4 CAL. ASSEM. J. (1969 Reg. Seas. 8060·61) (court's emphasis)). 
104. (West Supp. 1982). 
105. See tenBroek, supra note 13, at 291-317 for a discussion of how English poor 
law and common law were received in New York and adapted in California through the 
Field Draft Codes of the 1850's and 1860's. 
106. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. 
RBv. 205, 250 (1971). 
107. 43 ELIZ., ch. 2, § I (1601). 
108. See tenBroek, supra note 11, at 961-66 for discussion of how this principle lin-
gers in present welfare legislation. 
109. tenBroek, supra note 11, at 978. For further explanation of the differences be-
tween (1) the public law for the poor, dealing politically with expending and conserving 
public funds, and having penal overtones, and (2) the private law for the well-to-do, 
dealing non-politically with distributing family funds" and focusing on civil rights and 
responsibilities, see tenBroek, supra note 13, at 257. For a critique of tenBroek's analy-
sis, see Lewis & Levy, Family Law and Welfare Policies: The Case for "Dual Systems," 
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On its face, the dependency law is to provide for neglected 
and mistreated children, a proper exercise of the state's power of 
parens patriae. It is improper to use that power, however, "to 
further other objectives, deriving from its police power, that may 
conflict with the [children's] welfare,"l1O yet such is the charge 
leveled. 
[T]he common usage of neglect proceedings to 
punish parents for such behavior as promiscuity 
... , absent any proof that their children are ei-
ther aware of or harmed by their conduct, repre-
sents a distortion of child-welfare laws to further 
society's collective interest in morality . . . . To 
advance indirectly a collective state goal such as 
morality by resort to child-welfare regulation al-
lows state officials to infringe upon deeply per-
sonal and emotional attachments between parent 
and child in order to punish parental conduct pe-
ripheral to the relationship.lIl 
Middle-class households do not come under the scrutiny that 
poor households do;11I middle-class parents are presumed fit, 
but poor parents are not. 111 Moreover, the poor who are called 
upon to defend themselves must do so before middle-class 
judges. "[A]t the heart of most child welfare decisions is essen-
tially a value judgment as to 'what kind of child one hopes to 
produce . . . .' Yet, the values of juvenile judges . . . are reflec-
tions of their personal biases and . . . of their class biases. "114 
Professor Katz focuses blame for this misuse of power on 
vagueness in the statutes, which get used as "a means of policing 
the poor, especially parents on public welare, and other parents, 
often young, who do not conform either in dress, life-style, or 
child-rearing practices to dominant middle-class norms. Here 
the interests of the child become secondary to the desire to pun-
ish, thus subverting child protection .... "1111 California Welfare 
54 CALIF. L. REv. 748 (1966); for a defense. see Weyrauch, Dual Systems of Family Law: 
A Comment, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 781 (1966). 
110. Developments in the Law, supra note 30, at 1199. 
111. Note. State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations. 26 
STAN. L. REv. 1383. 1388-89 (1974). 
112. S. KATZ, supra note 42. at 42. 
113. tenBroek. supra note 11 (pt. 3), 17 STAN. L. REv. 614, 676 (1965). 
114. Note, supra note Ill, at 1386-87. 
115. S. KATZ. supra note 42. at 651. 
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and Institutions Code Section 600(a),118 the earlier version of the 
current Section 300, survived a challenge for vaguenessll7 that 
prompted the court to defend it thus: "[Ilt gives fair notice of 
the evil to be combatted in language giving fair notice to a par-
ent that in the proper care and support of his or her child the 
parent must exercise such control over the child as parents ordi-
narily exercise. "118 
Such a dismal picture is brightened somewhat by Professor 
Katz's acknowledgment that "[a]ppellate judges appear increas-
ingly unwilling to employ neglect laws to impose their middle-
class mores upon families and to punish a parent's undesirable 
conduct unless that conduct can be shown to result in damage to 
the child. "119 It has also been suggested that exposing a double 
standard-such as one law for the rich and another for the 
poor_12O may hurry its demise. 111 
The trouble is that liberal virtue on the part of appellate 
judges cannot be as valuable as it might be. This is because ap-
peals are not common even though the typical neglect proceed-
ing is informal and marked by considerable deference to the dis-
cretionary judgments of social workers and court investigators.ln 
Some idea of welfare agency thinking emerges from a California 
State Social Welfare Board proposal urging legislative enact-
ment of a presumption that any woman who gives birth to three 
illegitimate children is morally depraved. 111 At least the Board 
was willing to regard the presumption as rebuttable. In any 
event, its position never became the law. However, the implica-
tion in it that illicit sexual conduct per se could have the effect 
of making one an unfit mother has indeed been reflected in 
court opinions in the form of assumptions about the effect of 
conduct on children too young to know about it.114 
116. (West 1972). 
117. In re J.T., 40 Cal. App. 3d 633, 115 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1974). 
118. Id. at 638, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 566. 
119. S. KATZ, supra note 42, at 69. 
120. See supra text accompanying notes 109, 113. 
121. Weyrauch, supra note 109, at 791. 
122. Krause, Child Welfare, Parental Responsibility and the State, 6 FAM. L.Q. 
377,393 (1972). 
123. CAL. HUMAN RELATIONS AGENCY, DEPT. or SOCIAL WELrARE, PosmON STATE-
MENT: ILLEGITIMACY 11 (1972). 
124. See e.g., In re Corrigan, 134 Cal. App. 2d 751, 756, 286 P. 32, 36 (1955): 
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Ironically, a sexually active mother involved in neglect pro-
ceedings may find it to her advantage to be poor. Mothers have 
been excused for not legitimizing their relationships because 
they were financially unable to pursue divorce actions against 
the husbands from whom they had long since parted.llll One can 
only speculate how a rich woman would fare in such proceed-
ings, that is, one who did not marry the father of her children 
because she chose not to marry, not because she was unable to 
afford it. The speculation would be idle, however, because it is 
exceedingly unlikely that such a person would have to defend 
herself in dependency proceedings, no matter how she treated 
her children. The law more likely to affect the custody of the 
upper- and middle-class children is Civil Code Section 4600, not 
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 300. If their mother loses 
their custody, it is not likely to be to the state but to their fa-
ther. In this context, the "temporary" loss is regarded as much 
too insignificant for attention to be given to due process. Thus, 
mothers lose their children for indiscreet sexual behavior, behav-
ior that one would think insignificant, especially in contrast to 
the behavior of the father of one James M.188 Yet this father was 
allowed to keep his children although he had killed their mother 
by stabbing her twenty-two times. It appeared to matter to the 
court that he did not engage in this behavior in front of James 
and his three siblings. In 
C. CUSTODY AND BEST INTERESTS 
Civil Code Section 4600 on the custody of children has un-
dergone numerous revisions over the years.U8 In its present 
form, it retains the best interest standard without any express 
The capability of a parent to exercise proper parental control 
is largely determined by external standards and the likely ef-
fect continued misconduct will ultimately have on the welfare 
of a child as it grows up and realizes the significance of such 
misbehavior rather than the immediate effect upon the child, 
particularly where it is very young. 
125. E.g., In re A.J. t 274 Cal. App. 2d 199, 201, 78 Cal. Rptr. 880, 882 (1969); In re 
Raya, 255 Cal. App. 2d 260, 266-67, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252, 256-57 (1967). 
126. In re James M., 65 Cal. App. 3d 254, 135 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976). 
127. Id. at 259, 266, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 225, 229. 
128. It began as Section 138, enacted in 1872; the "best interest" standard was 
added in 1931; it became Section 4600 in 1970. The most recent amendment, in 1979, has 
deleted the tender years presumption and inStead given a strong preference to joint cus-
tody, which by its nature is a substantial movement away from the best interest stan-
dard. See CAL. Crv. CODE § 138 (West 1954); § 4600 (West 1970 & Supp. 1982). 
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definition. However, new language at least implicitly indicates a 
legislative assumption about what is in a child's best interest: 
"In making an order for custody to either parent, the court shall 
consider, among other factors, which parent is more likely to al-
low the child or children frequent and continuing contact with 
the noncustodial parent, and shall not prefer a parent as custo-
dian because of that parent's sex."lill In the final clause, the re-
jection of the tender years presumption is pointed. As to the 
preference for the parent who will more likely foster continuing 
contact with the other parent, that appears mainly to reinforce 
the strong preference for joint custody that has been added to 
the section.130 It is mentioned as being "among other factors"; 
alone it provides no workable tool for discovering what is in a 
child's best interest. 
Given the lack of statutory guidance, it appears especially 
appropriate to look to the experts in the field of child psychol-
ogy,131 although courts rarely appear to do that.lll According to 
such experts, what makes the best interest test particularly 
treacherous to apply is that it necessarily involves predictions, I .. 
even though long-term predictions as to how children will be af-
fected by their present environment are not trustworthy. IN An-
other problem is that the best interest test "does not. . . convey 
to the decisionmaker that the child. . . is already a victim of his 
environmental circumstances, that he is greatly at risk, and that 
speedy action is necessary to avoid further harm being done to 
his chances of healthy psychological development."l .. 
Awareness of these difficulties has led one critic to propose 
substituting for the best interest standard one that looks instead 
for "the least detrimental available alternative."u, This at least 
has the virtue of sounding less pretentious. It recognizes human 
fallibility and encourages humility on the part of the judge hav-
129. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b)(1) (West Supp. 1982). 
130. [d. 
131. Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problema of Custody Following Di· 
vorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55, 73 (1969). 
132. Foster & Freed, supra note 11, at 427. 
133. Watson, supra note 131, at 73. 
134. [d.; J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THB BBST 1NTBRBST8 0' THE 
CHILD 49·53 (1973) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN). 
135. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 134, at M. 
136. [d. at 53. 
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ing to make the decision as to which of two parents should have 
custody of their child. 
In the experts' assessments of custody law, there is also 
much attention given to the importance for a child of 
"[c]ontinuity of relationships, surroundings, and environmental 
infiuence,"1S7 so that "[w]hen a child is kept suspended, never 
quite knowing what will happen to him next, he must likewise 
suspend the shaping of his personality. This is a devastating re-
sult and probably represents one of the greatest risks which cur-
rent procedures pose for children."latI The procedures include 
the constant possibility of modifying the initial custody award 
made at the time of divorce or dissolution. The California cus-
tody laws have consistently provided for any "necessary or 
proper" award,· whether initial or modified. Never in California 
has there been a statutory "change of circumstances" rule. I " 
The law thus all but encourages frequent litigation attempting 
to modify custody. even though "[i]n the view of most child psy-
chiatrists stability of the environment is far more crucial than 
its precise nature and content. The one thing with which chil-
137. 1d. at 31. 
138. Watson, supra note 131, at 64. 
139. Compare e.,., OHIO REv. CODB ANN. § 3109.04(b) (Page 1980), providing: 
The court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless it 
finds, based on facts which have arisen since the prior decree 
or which were unknown to the court at the time of the prior 
decree, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the 
child or his custodian, and that the modification is necessary 
to serve the best interests of the child. In applying these stan-
dards, the court shall retain the custodian designated by the 
prior decree unleBB one of the following applies: (1) The custo-
dian agrees to a change in custody. (2) The child, with the 
consent of the custodian, has been integrated into the family 
of the person seeking custody. (3) The child's present environ-
ment endangers significantly his physical health or his mental, 
moral, or emotional development and the harm likely to be 
caused by a change of environment is outweighed by the ad-
vantages of such change to the child. 
This section then goes on to incorporate the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act's list of 
factors relevant to best interest. See supra text accompanying note 57. The Ohio statute 
is designed to favor continuity and stability by posing a complicted and difficult teat 
before a custody decree is to be modified. However, having practiced family law in Ohio 
for three years, this author can testify to the limited value of even the most carefully 
drawn statute in an area where the trier of fact has great discretion. If the trier of fact 
wants the decree modified, the requisite change of circumstances will be found; if not, 
the change will not be found. 
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dren have most difficulty coping is unpredictable variation. "140 
The history of California modification cases has been full of 
shifts. A leading early California Supreme Court case explaining 
best interest principles insisted that for modification there must 
be compelling change.141 This position was reinforced in a subse-
quent appellate court's insistence that the custodial parent's 
conduct producing the changed circumstances must have some 
specific impact on the child's well-being.14• 
However, ~h~n a court wanted to modify and had no 
changed 'circumstances on which to base the modification, it 
simply pointed out that the change is not required by statute, 
that the "rule" is really only a policy to prevent "vexatious liti-
gation," and that, furthermore, this policy is only an evidentiary 
aid to a court exercising its discretion in a child's best inter-
est.143 Citing this case, another appellate court went to far 
greater lengths to try to kill the rule, producing limitations 
never expressed before, although it would seem from the court's 
opinion that they were not new: 
The rule that there must be a showing of 
"changed circumstances" has no application 
where the trial court has modified a decree. That 
rule only applies where the trial court has refused 
to modify a decree and it is contended an abuse 
of discretion occurred. To show such abuse there 
must be a showing of changed circumstances!" 
While this view has not been given subsequent attention, the 
view has been followed that change of circumstances, or lack of 
it, is only evidence, like any other.140 
Another later expressed limitation is that no change of cir-
cumstances should be necessary to modify a stipulated custody 
award because the parties' agreement forestalled any litigation 
140. Watson. supra note 131, at 71. 
141. Prouty v. Prouty, 16 Cal. 2d 190, 193, 105 P.2d 295, 297 (1940). 
142. Washburn v. Washburn, 49 Cal. App. 2d 581, 587, 122 P.2d 96, 100 (1942). 
143. Kel1y v. Kelly, 75 Cal. App. 2d 408, 415-16, 171 P.2d 95, 96 (1946). 
144. Frizzell v. Frizzell, 158 Cal. App. 2d 652, 655, 323 P.2d 188, 191 (1968). 
145. See Urquhart v. Urquhart, 196 Cal. App. 2d 297, 301, 16 Cal. Rptr. 469, 471 
(1961). 
Women's Law Forum 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss3/1
1982] CUSTODIAL PARENTS 527 
of the best interest of the child.148 The case setting forth this 
limitation was expressly disapproved in a much more recent Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court case, In re Marriage of Carney,l4'7 pro-
claiming the continued vitality of the change of circumstances 
rule. The real lesson of Carney, however, is to be learned not 
from its pronouncements but from its facts. The mother having 
given up custody by stipulation five years earlier, it was the per-
fect modification setting in which to argue that no change 
should be required because best interest had not been litigated. 
If change was to be required, however, it certainly was available; 
the custodial father had in the interim become a quadraplegic. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's trans-
fer of custody to the mother. The opinion is a model of respect 
for the state's policy of not punishing the handicapped. UII It is 
perhaps admirable in its insistence that good fathering is not to 
be defined exclusively in terms of participation in Sports.148 
However, if this case is supposed to teach that the change of 
circumstances rule is alive and well, but that here there was no 
change, then it gives a double message. The lesson though is 
clear: Practitioners rely at their peril on the supportive rhetoric 
in court opinions. They should look instead with cold, clear eye 
at what courts do and why. 
Whether or not a change of circumstances is said to be re-
quired by a given court for modification, and indeed whether the 
setting is modification or initial award, sexual activity between 
the mother and a man other than the father has the capacity to 
produce custody battles that are at least vigorous and at most 
vituperative to the point that one wonders whether the father is 
motivated more by concern for the best interests of his child or 
by desire to take revenge upon the child's mother. 
In the exercise of their discretion, courts can respond to al-
legations about the mother's sexual conduct by viewing it in one 
of four ways: (1) taking the position that such conduct conclu-
sively disqualifies the mother as custodian, (2) rebuttably 
presuming her unfit, (3) rebuttably presuming a future direct 
146. See Loudermilk v. Loudermilk, 208 Cal. App. 2d 705, 707-08, 25 Cal. Rptr. 434, 
436 (1962). 
147. 24 Cal. 3d 725, 730·31, 598 P.2d 36, 36, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383, 385 (1979). 
148. rd. at 736-40, 598 P.2d at 42-46, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 389-92. 
149. rd. at 737-39, 598 P.2d at 43-44, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 369-91. 
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adverse impact of her conduct on the child, or (4) requiring such 
impact be presently shown before denying her custody. laO While 
it is possible to work out complicated tests for which approach is 
actually applied in any given case, a survey of the California 
cases lends itself to a simpler division between those cases in 
which some level of presumption works against the mother and 
those in which an actual showing of present adverse impact is 
required for denial of custody. 
A sexually active mother should be denied custody "when 
[her] child's physical or emotional well-being is immediately, de-
monstrably, and seriously threatened.mll The reason to require 
that the adverse impact be present and demonstrated rather 
than predicted or presumed is that to allow prediction and pre-
sumption is to encourage "a decision based more on abhorrence 
of parental moral values and conduct than on an analysis of 
what disposition would be in the best interests of the child,"UI 
and to "creat[e] an unacceptably high risk that a desire to pun-
ish rather than a genuine concern with the best interests of the 
child will influence the exercise of judicial discretion. "la8 These 
concerns focus on the potential for judges to make decisions 
based on improper motives, but more important than motive is 
result. If the experts are right that stability, predictability, and 
continuity are the primary values, then it may be that attending 
to the sexually active mother's rights and attending to her 
child's best interests lead to the same conclusion: Absent actual 
present harm, the mother's conduct should not cause her to lose 
custody. 
The United States Supreme Court has in other contexts 
pointed out the inappropriateness of legal classifications based 
on "sin,"114 and decisions that have the effect of punishing the 
child for the mother's immorality.m Comparable principles have 
been expressed by California courts,118 sometimes in cases in-
150. Lauerman, Nonmarital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U. CrN. L. REv. 
647, 654, 670·71 (1977). 
151. Id. at 723. 
152. Id. at 675. 
153. Id. at 672. 
154. See, e.g., Glona v. American Guar. Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1965). 
155. See, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 325 (1968). 
156. See, e.g., In re W.O., 88 Cal. App. 3d 906, 910, 152 Cal. Rptr. 130, 132 (1979) 
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volving parental battles for custody. Washburn v. Washburn l !!' 
was decided forty years ago, but the court sounds quite contem-
porary in its approach: 
[A]cts and conduct of one of the parties to 
the divorce which give offense to the other, or 
even to the public at large, are not a matter that 
calls for or permits a change of custody unless 
such acts and conduct are shown to affect directly 
the welfare and best interests of the child. Where 
a court has decreed custody to one parent, such 
parent may not be deprived of the custody for 
any supposed unfitness unless it be shown that he 
or she is so unfit as to endanger the child's wel-
fare. A custody proceeding is not one to discipline 
one parent for such parent's shortcomings as an 
individual, nor to reward the other for any wrong 
suffered therefrom. I" 
However, by no means are all the California opinions im-
mune from the criticisms of Professors Foster and Freed that 
"as a group [cases involving custody awards) are marked by 
question-begging, rigid rules, and platitudes .... "11i9 Here is 
what an appellate court had to say about one adulterous woman: 
"[W]e do not well see how it can be reasonably contended that 
. . . a married woman having such loose ideas of morality . . . 
can be said to be a fit and proper person to control, shape or 
guide the destinites of minor children."16o 
It may seem easy to write off such a statement as reflecting 
the outmoded thinking of half a century ago; yet here is a far 
more recent statement in which the tone is not appreciably dif-
ferent. The court describes a relationship as "a defiant mainte-
nance . . . of living conditions in which a child, rapidly leaving 
babyhood, was being continuously exposed to almost inevitable 
("Punishing the parent distorts the focus of the custody inquiry; that focus must be 
exclusively on the question whether actual harm will come to the child."). 
157. 49 Cal. App. 2d 581, 122 P.2d 96 (1942). 
158. [d. at 587-88, 122 P.2d at 100 (court's emphasis), quoted with approval in Sor-
rels v. Sorrels, 105 Cal. App. 2d 465, 471, 234 P.2d 103, 106 (1951); see also Ashwell v. 
Ashwell, 135 Cal. App. 2d 211, 217, 286 P.2d 983,987 (1955) quoted with approval in 
Bialac v. Bialac, 240 Cal. App. 2d 940, 947, 50 Cal. Rptr. 12, 16 (1966). 
159. See Foster & Freed, supra note 11, at 427. 
160. Warren v. Warren, 127 Cal. App. 231, 239-40, 15 P.2d 556, 559 (1932). 
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discovery of his mother's improbity"181 and also as "an open and 
notorious bringing of a paramour into the home under circum-
stances defying accepted social concepts. "18a After such state-
ments as these, the unvarnished statement of the general princi-
ple begins to seem something of an understatement: "[IJn nearly 
every case, one of the things considered in deciding what is for 
the welfare of the child is the personal behavior and characteris-
tics of the parent. "18a 
Ultimately, there appear to be no significant differences in 
California between initial award and modification cases, either 
in what the standards are or in how they are applied. What does 
matter, to a critical degree, is whether the court employs some 
level of presumption that the mother's sexual activity will be 
harmful to the child. No matter how easily the presumption is 
claimed to be rebuttable, if the court requires anything less than 
an actual showing of present direct adverse impact, the mother 
is very likely not to be granted custody. 
In affirming the denial of custody to one adulterous mother 
for conduct described as "indiscriminate, profligate and shame-
less,"184 the court expressed the principle that has been at the 
root of the presumption against sexually active mothers: "To be 
entrusted with the rearing of children a mother should be pos-
sessed of such character and conduct that by the force of her 
example she can train them in the paths of morality, righteous-
ness and rectitude. "18a Here surely is the sort of rigid and plati-
tudinous statement to which Professors Foster and Freed refer. 
Long is the list of mothers who have lost their children because 
of just such thinking.188 The sexually active mother can lose her 
children to a bigamist;18'7 she can lose them to a child-snatch-
161. Dahl v. Dahl, 237 Cal. App. 2d 407, 412, 46 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884 (1965). 
162. [d. 
163. Stack v. Stack, 189 Cal. App. 2d !it 371, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 188. 
164. Currin v. Currin, 125 Cal. App. 2d 644, 650, 271 P.2d 61, 65 (1954). 
165. [d. 
166. See, e.g., Dahl v. Dahl, 237 Cal. App. 2d 407, 46 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1965); Foley v. 
Foley, 214 Cal. App. 2d 802, 29 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1963); Mathewson v. Mathewson, 207 Cal. 
App. 2d 532, 24 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1962); Santans v. Santans, 180 Cal. App. 2d 809, 4 Cal. 
Rptr. 635 (1960); Bush v. Bush, 72 Cal. App. 2d 487, 164 P.2d 774 (1946); Warren v. 
Warren, 127 Cal. App. 2d 231, 15 P.2d 556 (1932); Russell v. Russell, 20 Cal. App. 457, 
129 P. 467 (1912). 
167. See, e.g., Grubaugh v. Grubaugh, 200 Cal. App. 2d 151, 19 Cal. Rptr. 141 
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er.lSS She can lose a child far too young to have any knowledge 
of her sexual conduct or its impact.lse She can lose her child 
even if she has attempted to "cure" her fault by marrying the 
man with whom she has had her sexual involvement.17o 
How completely a court can discard the best interest stan-
dard is perhaps best illustrated in a case where the appellate 
court affirmed the transfer to the father of custody of a fifteen 
month old baby.l'71 The court expressly acknowledged that the 
child "did not appreciate the impropriety of his mother's con-
duct."tn That, however, was of no consequence. The appellate 
court approved of the fact that the mother's "deceitful and im-
moral conduct was the paramount and primary factor upon 
which [the trial judge] based his decision. "178 Here is a court 
openly more interested in punishing a mother than protecting 
her child-and proud of it. 
Presumption cases are not the only ones in which a mother 
loses custody. She also loses custody when the court requires a 
showing of direct adverse impact and finds it, such as in a case 
where the mother's sexual encounters involve her leaving her 
children alone all night,1'74 or where having men stay overnight 
produces "an unwholesome environment for a boy at [an] im-
pressionable age."1'7a The only cases in which the mother consist-
ently prevails are those in which direct adverse impact is re-
quired and not found. l'7S 
(1962). 
168. See. e.g .• Currin v. Currin. 125 Cal. App. 2d 644, 271 P.2d 61 (1954). 
169. See. e.g .• Dahl v. Dahl, 237 Cal. App. 2d 407. 46 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1965); Foley v. 
Foley. 214 Cal. App. 2d 802, 29 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1963); Mathewson v. Mathewson. 207 Cal. 
App. 2d 532, 24 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1962); Edwards v. Palleschi, 167 Cal. App. 3d 555. 334 
P.2d 671 (1959); Currin v. Currin. 125 Cal. App. 2d 644. 271 P.2d 61 (1954). 
170. See. e.g .• Edwards v. Palleschi. 167 Cal. App. 2d 555. 334 P.2d 671 (1959). 
171. Mathewson v. Mathewson. 207 Cal. App. 2d 532. 24 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1962). 
172. Id. at 539, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 471. 
173. Id. at 538. 24 Cal. Rptr. at 470. 
174. See. e.g .• Harris v. Harris. 186 Cal. App. 2d 788. 9 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1960). 
175. Coil v. Coil. 211 Cal. App. 2d 411. 416, 27 Cal. Rptr. 378, 381 (1962). 
176. See. e.g .• In re Marriage of Wellman. 104 Cal. App. 3d 992.164 Cal. Rptr. 148 
(1980); In re Marriage of Russo, 21 Cal. App. 3d 72, 98 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1971); Nelson v. 
Nelson, 261 Cal. App. 2d SOO. 68 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1968) (particularlY noteworthy because 
child here did see mother in bed with man); Bialac v. Bialac, 240 Cal. App. 2d 940, 50 
Cal. Rptr. 12 (1966); Newell v. Newell. 146 Cal. App. 2d 166, 303 P.2d 839 (1956); Ash-
well v. Ashwell. 135 Cal. App. 2d 211. 286 P.2d 983 (1955); Sorrels v. Sorrels, 105 Cal. 
App. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 103 (1951). 
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Reading the range of the cases, one begins to suspect that 
courts decide result first and then make a compatible decision 
about the presumption. If a court decides, for whatever reason, 
expressed or not, that a woman ought not to have custody, then 
that court can either make the presumption operate or it can 
insist on a showing of impact and find the impact. Likewise, if a 
court decides that a woman ought to have custody, then that 
court can refuse to accept any presumption, require impact, and 
not find it. 
In the search for predictability, three factors are worth not-
ing. The first is that the courts tend to express much more moral 
outrage at mothers who are promiscuous than at those who have 
but one sexual relationship.1'77 Second only to promiscuity as a 
trigger for a court's ire is the mother's lying about her sexual 
conduct,178 especially if she attempts to conceal a pregnancy 
from the courtP' Finally, courts that find in favor of the sexu-
ally active mothers in spite of their sex lives are quick to note 
any evidence of remorse or "reform" and make much of it.lso 
The key may be that some judges like to patronize as much as 
they like to punish, as in a statement such as this one: "The 
frankness and candor with which [the mother] explained her 
transgressions . . . impressed the court and gave credence to 
other evidence of her good faith and determination to rectify 
past errors. "181 
Sexual activity has not been the issue on appeal very often 
in the last ten years. It would be a mistake to conclude, however, 
that this means that courts and litigants alike have come to see 
it as a matter irrelevant to the best interests of children. The 
continuing potential for controversy is illustrated in a 1980 case 
where an appellate court held invalid a condition in a custody 
award that prohibited the mother from living with a man to 
177. Compare Dahl v. Dahl, 237 Cal. App. 2d 4Q7, 46 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1965) and Coil 
v. Coil, 211 Cal. App. 2d 411, 27 Cal. Rptr. 378 (1962) (promiscuity) with In re Raya, 255 
Cal. App. 2d 260, 63 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1967) (stability). 
178. See, e.g., Santens v. Santens, 180 Cal. App. 2d 809, 4 Cal. Rptr. 636 (1960). 
179. See, e.g., Mathewson v. Mathewson, 207 Cal. App. 2d 632, 24 Cal. Rptr. 466 
(1962); Edwards v. Palleschi, 167 Cal. App. 2d 666, 334 P.2d 671 (1959). 
180. See e.g., In re Russo, 21 Cal. App. 3d 72, 98 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Neleon v. 
Neleon, 261 Cal. App. 2d 800, 68 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1968). 
181. Nelson v. Nelson, 261 Cal. App. 2d at 802, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 428 (1968). 
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whom she was not married"" Because the court's opinion men-
tions the rights of privacy and association,188 it would be tempt-
ing to make much of this case as imposing constitutional sanc-
tions on violating custodial mothers' rights. However, it would 
be a misrepresentation of the case to do so, for the court de-
clines to make the constitutional issues the basis for the deci-
sion. Rather, the decision rests simply on there having been no 
evidence presented with respect to impact. 1M In other words, 
this case is actually just one more that requires impact and does 
not find it. The door is still very much open for impact to be 
found in future cases and to govern their results. 
Furthermore, there is a concurring opinion in this 1980 case 
couched in language reminiscent of the opinions of many de-
cades ago: 
If the evidence were otherwise, I would, of course, 
be glad to leap . . . into the murky waters of pa-
rental sexual morality and its impact upon minor 
children. There are other rights dimly discernable 
in those depths: the rights, for example, of non-
custodial parents to have their children raised in 
circumstances consonant with still widely shared 
notions of decent behavior; the. rights of children 
to be protected from the effects of 'depravity' 
. . .; and the right of government to insist that 
certain traditional notions of morality be main-
tained within families, for the benefit of the 
state.llil 
V. CONCLUSION 
What may matter most-no matter which statute is invoked 
to try to take custody from the sexually active mother-is that 
appellate courts are loath to reverse cases in an area about 
which trial courts have such broad discretion. 1M Thus, "the force 
of a case as a precedent depends very greatly on whether it re-
182. In re Wellman, 104 Cal. App. 3d 992, 999, 164 Cal. Rptr. 148, 152-53 (1980). 
183. Id. at n.5, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 152. 
184. Id. at 999, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53. 
185. Id. at 1000, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 153 (Newson, J., concurring). 
186. See Prouty v. Prouty, 16 Cal. 2d 190, 191, 105 P.2d 295, 296 (1940) (citing 
Taber v. Taber, 209 Cal. 755, 290 P. 36 (1930); Simmons v. Simmons, 22 Cal. App. 448, 
134 P. 791 (1913)). 
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versed or affirmed the order appealed from . . . . "187 Likewise, 
the usefulness of a case turns out to depend on how the court 
approaches its task in the opinion. What particularly frustrates 
careful analysis occurs when the court narrates at length the 
facts about the mother's life style and then abruptly concludes 
that it was no breach of discretion to remove a child from such a 
home.188 One reads in vain to discover whether the result would 
change if one or another or all but one of the facts were altered. 
Opinions in cases reversing custody denials are organized 
quite differently. If the mother gets the child, the court analyzes 
and explains at length after narrating the facts very briefly, if at 
all. 188 In any event, this is definitely not an area in which 
mothers can look to the appellate court to right trial court 
wrongs. Even if a given mother has the rare case that produces 
an appellate reversal in her favor, the damage done to the con-
tinuity and stability in the child's life will not be undone by that 
reversal. 
Twice so far, the United States Supreme Court has been 
asked to enter the custody area and twice it has refused to grant 
certiorari. The first time, a father had brought an habeas corpus 
action to regain custody of his son from the maternal grandpar-
ents to whom he had turned over the boy after the mother died. 
The Iowa Supreme Court preferred the conventional, middle-
class Iowa grandparents in their sixties to have custody of the 
boy of seven instead of his California "Bohemian" father. The 
United States Supreme Court would not become involved. ItO 
The second time the Court would not grant certiorari was 
when a mother lost custody of her three daughters to their fa-
ther because the illinois Supreme Court found that her violation 
of the state's fornication statute showed "disregard for existing 
standards of conduct [that] instructs her children, by example 
that they too, may ignore them and could well encourage the 
187. Stack v. Stack, 189 Cal. App. 2d at 372, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 188. 
188. See, e.,., Mathewson v. Mathewson, 207 Cal. App. 2d 532, 24 Cal. Rptr. 466 
(1962). 
189. See, e.,., In re J.T., 40 Cal. App. 3d 633, 115 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1974). 
190. Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 1393-96, 140 N.W.2d 152, 154-55, cert. 
denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966). 
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children to engage in similar activity in the future."1t1 
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun dissented from 
the denial of certiorari to address "the question whether the Due 
Process Clause entitles [the mother] to a meaningful hearing at 
which the trial judge determines, without use of a conclusive 
presumption, whether violation of the fornication statute ad-
versely affects the well-being of the children."llIs Justice Bren-
nan goes further than simply to acknowledge that the use of 
such a presumption poses a due process question, however. On 
the substance of the presumption he says in his opinion, joined 
by Justice Marshall: "Nothing ... in logic supports a conclu-
sion that divorced parents who fornicate, for that reason alone, 
are unfit or adversely affect the well-being and development of 
their children in any degree over and above whatever adverse 
effect separation and divorce may already have had on the 
children. "1111 
While it is good to know that there are at least two, and 
possibly three, justices who understand the inadequacy of the 
presumption to address the interests of children, it remains un-
likely that any time soon custody disputes between parents will 
be viewed by the entire Court as deserving attention to due pro-
cess. There is still represented on the Court the view that even 
termination proceedings do not warrant such attention. In his 
dissenting opinion in Santosky v. Kramer, Justice Rehnquist 
worries that the majority "begins . . . a trend of federal inter-
vention in state family law matters which surely will stifle crea-
tive responses to vexing problems."IH 
If custody problems are "vexing," as they surely are; if "cre-
ative responses" are the products of state courts' discretion, 
which is often virtually immune from review; and if the legal loss 
of a child is only now beginning to be recognized as of sufficient 
magnitude to warrant due process protection in any statutory 
setting, then at their peril do mothers themselves engage in pre-
sumptions about the courts of a liberal state in liberated times? 
191. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 m. 2d 337, 346·47, 400 N.E.2d 421, 424 (1979), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980). 
192. 449 U.S. at 931 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
193. [d. at 930. 
194. 50 U.S.L.W. 4333,4345 (U.S. March 23, 1982). 
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Given a custody statute that is silent on some important matters 
and vague on others, together with a collection of inconsistent 
court opinions for precedents, judges may do with their discre-
tion virtually whatever they will. 
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